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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAY M. BECKSTEAD, JEANNE 
BERTRAND, and JEANNE FONTAINE, 
Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. MARSING, GAY MARSING, 
DONALD RAY DENNIS, FRANCIS H. 
DENNIS, JEFFERY W. McBRIDE, 
and BARBARA H. McBRIDE, 
Defendants/ 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20411 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. WHETHER A VENDEE IN THE PURCHASE OF REAL 
PROPERTY PLACED IN ESCROW HAS UNTIL DELIVERY OF DEED FROM 
DEPOSITORY AFTER THE FINAL PAYMENT IS MADE TO REQUIRE REFORMATION 
OF CONTRACT. 
2. WHETHER A SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY 
CHARGED WITH INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE AND CLAIMS OF A PURPORTED 
PRIOR PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY BY REASON OF RECORDING OF A 
NOTICE OF CONTRACT INTEREST, AND AFTER PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF 
CLAIM TO REAL PROPERTY, CAN BE PLACED IN TITLE IN A SUIT- TO 
VOID THE CONVEYANCE TO HIM BECAUSE OF THE RUNNING OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (THREE YEARS FROM DISCOVERY OF MISTAKE) 
PRIOR TO AN ACTION BEING BROUGHT TO CORRECT AN ERROR IN THE 
CONTRACT AND DEED. 
3. WHETHER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD AND 
MISTAKE IS TOLLED WHERE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE STATUTE RUNS 
IS IN POSSESSION OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES. 
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4. WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS 
AGAINST A PARTY IN AN ACTION WHO FILES AN ACTION AFTER 
DISCOVERY OF A MISTAKE BUT DOES NOT ALLEGE FRAUD FOR A 
MISTAKE. 
STATUTES 
1. Section 57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended: 
Record imparts notice. Every conveyance, or 
instrument in writing affecting real estate, 
executed, acknowledged or proved, and certified, 
in the manner prescribed by this title, and 
every patent to lands within this state duly 
executed and verified according to law, and 
every judgment, order or decree of any court 
of record in this state, or a copy thereof, 
required by law to be recorded in the office 
of the county recorder, and every financing 
statement which complies with the provisions 
of section 70A-9-402 shall, from the time of 
filing the same with the recorder for record, 
impart notice to all persons of the contents 
thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees 
and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase 
and take with notice. 
2. Section 78-12-26(3), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended: 
Within three years: An action for relief on 
the ground of fraud or mistake; but the cause 
of action in such case shall not be deemed to 
have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action for breach of contract, for 
reformation of contract and deed, and for voidance of 
deed to subsequent purchaser. Defendants filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, moving for dismissal of Plaintiffs1 
Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiffs had not filed their 
action within three years of discovering that a mistake in 
the description in the contract had been made. Plaintiffs 
claim that Defendants had actual, as well as constructional, 
notice of Plaintiffs1 claim, that Plaintiffs had partial 
possession, and that Plaintiffs had until final payment was 
made on the contract before the Statute of Limitations would 
start to run, and therefore that the three-year Statute of 
Limitations for mistake does not apply. The Court found 
that Plaintiffs "learned of the incorrect description in the 
deed and in the contract...no later than May 1979" and held 
that 78-12-26(3) applied and that Plaintiffs1 action was 
barred. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the summer of 1977, Defendant GAY MARSING and 
Plaintiff GAY BECKSTEAD were real estate agents for Opheikens 
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& Co. Realty (R-38, 142). Defendant MARSING, in the summer 
of 1977, put her home and thirteen (13) acres on the market 
for sale. She was in the process of going through a divorce 
and was anxious to sell her property to resolve her divorce 
settlement requirements (R-39f 142). After a period of time 
of having no prospects to sell the home and the acreage, she 
decided to sell the house separate from the acreage (R-39, 
143) . 
Plaintiff BECKSTEAD was interested in purchasing 
the acreage behind Defendant MARSING1s house and was shown 
the property by MARSING in August of 1977 (R-40, 41, 143). 
At the time Defendant MARSING showed the property to Plaintiff 
BECKSTEAD, a Weber County plat of the property (R-136) was 
referred to in Defendant MARSING1s representation of the 
amount of property being offered to Plaintiff BECKSTEAD (R-
41). The acreage shown on the Weber County plat owned by 
Defendant MARSING indicated Defendant MARSING was the owner 
of 1.89 acres, 8.66 acres, and 1.55 acres (R-136, 143). The 
1.89 acres was the land on which the house was located; the 
8.66 acres was the land behind the house; the 1.55 acres was 
for access and also additional land behind the house (R-
143). The land offered to the Plaintiff BECKSTEAD by the 
Defendant MARSING was approximately ten (10) acres (8.66 
plus 1.55) (R-60, 143). 
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On August 11, 1977, an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase was executed by the parties wherein Defendant 
MARSING agreed to sell to Plaintiff BECKSTEAD 10 acres plus 
three shares of irrigation water for the sum of $25,000.00 
($2,500.00 per acre) (R-43, 55, 143). 
The sale was to be closed on September 16, but, at 
the request of Defendant MARSING, the sale was not closed 
until October 5, 1977 (R-144). 
Shortly after the MARSING-BECKSTEAD contract had 
been entered into, Defendant MARSING stated that she had 
shown the home to Defendant DONALD DENNIS; that he was quite 
interested, but desired to have more ground with the house, 
at which time Plaintiff BECKSTEAD said to the Defendant 
MARSING that she (BECKSTEAD) was glad that "we got our ten 
acres first" (R-144). 
Defendants DONALD and FRANCIS DENNIS bought the 
home and 1.89 acres in the latter part of 1977 (R-60, 145). 
Defendant MARSING, by agreement, was to survey the 
division line between the two properties, and in the spring 
of 1978 Plaintiff BECKSTEAD went to the property to put up a 
fence in accordance with the survey stakes, but could not 
find them and was informed by Defendant DONALD DENNIS that 
he knew where the line was and where the markers had been 
that were no longer there (R-144). Having no reason to 
doubt him, the fence was put up where DONALD DENNIS indicated 
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the markers had been (R-144). The fence is probably not on 
any deeded lines (R-67). 
In the fall of 1978, the Plaintiff BECKSTEAD 
offered the property for sale to Plaintiffs BERTRAND and 
FONTAINE. The Weber County plat was again referred to, 
showing the 8.66 acres and the 1.55 acres (R-144). A contract 
for the ten acres was entered into by the parties on February 
16, 1979, for a price of $35,000.00 ($3,500.00) per acre (R-
144). 
In February 1979, when Plaintiff BECKSTEAD sold 
the ten acres to Plaintiffs BERTRAND and FONTAINE, a Notice 
of Contract Interest was prepared, correctly describing the 
8.66 acres and 1.55 acres, and recorded in the Weber County 
Recorders Office in February 1979 (R-139, 145, 146). 
In March or April of 1979, Defendant DONALD 
DENNIS contacted Plaintiff BECKSTEAD, indicating that he had 
received the tax notice showing the legal description of 
1.89 acres (R-145), claiming he had bought three acres. 
Plaintiff BECKSTEAD told Defendant DENNIS at that time that 
she (BECKSTEAD) had bought ten acres and that he (DENNIS) 
could not have purchased three acres, because there were 
only two acres left to sell (R-145). Plaintiff BECKSTEAD 
then contacted Defendant MARSING concerning this call (April 
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or May 1979), and was told there appeared to be a problem, 
but she (Defendant MARSING) had taken care of it (R-145). 
About April 1979, Plaintiffs BECKSTEAD and BERTRAND 
picked up copies of the legal descriptions at the Weber 
County Recorder's office. The descriptions and the plats 
showed the 8.66 acres and 1.55 acres in MARSING1s name 
(these were subject to the contract between BECKSTEAD and 
MARSING), and the 1.89 acres in the name of DENNIS (R-145). 
In May 1979, Plaintiff BECKSTEAD received a call 
from DONALD DENNIS, informing her that he had received a 
Warranty Deed for an additional acre (R-145). Plaintiff 
BECKSTEAD again reviewed the plats and descriptions at the 
Weber County Recorder's office and found that there were now 
2.91 acres in the name of Defendant DONALD DENNIS (R-145). 
The deed referred to by DONALD DENNIS had been purportedly 
signed on December 5, 1977, but not notarized until January 
26, 1979, and was not recorded until May 1979 (R-139) . 
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
between Plaintiff BECKSTEAD and Defendant MARSING called for 
ten acres (R-137, 138). The contract, escrow, and deed 
placed in escrow between MARSING and BECKSTEAD was described 
to cover only nine of the ten acres (R-146). The contract 
and escrow between BECKSTEAD and MARSING was not paid in 
full by BECKSTEAD until 1983, after the lawsuit had been 
filed by Plaintiffs against Defendants (T-146). Defendant 
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GAY MARSINGfs Warranty Deed to Plaintiff GAY BECKSTEAD was 
not delivered to Plaintiff GAY BECKSTEAD until final payment 
had been made in October 1983 (R-146). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It is Plaintiffs1 position that they had until the 
time of the final payment of the contract and receipt of 
deed from depository before the Statute of Limitations would 
commence to run on any action they might bring against the 
Defendants for reformation, mistake, or voidance of documents. 
It is Plaintiffs1 further position that Defendants 
cannot complain against Plaintiffs1 claimed interest in the 
acre of property in question because the Defendants were on 
notice by reason of a recording of Notice of Contract Interest 
and actual notice given Defendants by Plaintiffs of Plaintiffs' 
claimed interest prior to any stated or recorded claim of 
Defendants in the property in question. 
While the fence dividing the possession between 
Plaintiffs and Defendants was not placed on a deed line, 
Defendants were aware of Plaintiffs' claim to possession of 
the property in question, and because of Defendants' knowledge 
of such claim, Plaintiffs should not be barred by the Statute 
of Limitations that requires that an action for mistake or 
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fraud be filed within three years of the time of finding out 
that a mistake has been made. 
While an action for fraud^  and mistake may be 
appropriate in the instant case, other actions, such as 
breach of contract, voidance of documents, reformation of 
descriptions, or quiet title action should not be precluded 
by the three-year Statute of Limitations for mistake. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
WHETHER A VENDEE IN THE PURCHASE OF REAL PROPERTY 
PLACED IN ESCROW HAS UNTIL DELIVERY OF DEED FROM 
DEPOSITORY AFTER THE FINAL PAYMENT IS MADE TO 
REQUIRE REFORMATION OF CONTRACT. 
1. The vendor in the sale of real property 
placed in escrow pending final payment has until the final 
payment is made to perform per the terms of the real estate 
contract. The Utah Supreme Court follows this reasoning in 
Hurwitz v. David B. Richards and Company, 436 P.2d 794 (20 
U. 2d 232), quoting Section 451, Contracts, in 17 Amjur 2d: 
"It is a well-established general rule that where 
a party repudiates a contract before time for 
performance arrives, the repudiation may be withdrawn 
unless the other party, before the withdrawal, 
manifests an election to rescind the contract or 
materially change his position in reliance on the 
repudiation. The locus poenidentiae is kept open 
until the injured party elects to treat the contract 
as abandoned by the other party and brings action 
for nonperformance." 
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In the Hurwitz v. David B. Richards and Company 
case, the Utah Supreme Court further quotes Diamos v. Hirsch, 
91 A. 304, 372 P.2d 76: 
"We have recognized that an action may be maintained 
for breach of contract based upon the anticipatory 
repudiation by one of the parties in the contract. 
It is well-established that in order to constitute 
an anticipatory breach of contract there must be 
a positive and unequivocal manifestation on the 
part of the party allegedly repudiating that he 
will not render the promised performance when the 
time fixed for it in the contract arrives. And as 
succinctly pointed out in Section 319 of the 
Restatement of Law of Contracts, the effect of 
repudiation is nullified; '(a) where statements 
constituting such a repudiation are withdrawn by 
information to the effect given by the repudiator 
to the injured party before he has brought an 
action on the breach or has otherwise materially 
changedTTis position in reliance on them; **.»" 
Again in the Hurwitz v. David B. Richards case the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that the party having the right to 
declare an anticipatory breach had three options available: 
"1. Treat the entire contract as broken and sue 
for damages, 2. Treat the contract as still 
binding and wait until the time arrives for its 
performance and at such time bring an action on 
the contract [underlining added]. 3. RescmcPthe 
contract and sue for the money paid or for the 
value of services or property furnished." 
This line of reasoning is also propounded in 
Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 513 P.2d 417 (30 U.2d 47), where 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Corporation Nine also essays that it is entitled 
to damages against the Taylors because they had 
committed a breach of contract by entering into an 
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agreement with a Mr. Jerry Young to sell part of 
the land to him. Two points support the trial 
court in rejecting this claim. First, the law 
does not require the vendor to have clear and 
marketable title at all times during~the performance 
of its contract, and is not ordinarily so obliged 
until the time"~comes for him to perforirTTunderlining 
added]. The buyers should not be heard to complain 
unless it appears that it will be impossible or at 
least highly unlikely that seller will be able to 
perform his contract when he is called upon to do 
so, which we do not see as the situation here. 
Complimenting this is the fact that the buyer 
himself should not be heard to complain when it is 
his own default which is preventing fulfillment of 
the contract." 
This doctrine is also found in Doxey-Layton Company 
v. Stark, 54 8 P.2d 902. The Utah Supreme Court, in commenting 
on the Statute of Limitations where a contract and deed are 
held in escrow, stated: 
"This Statute allows an action to be brought on 
the ground of fraud or mistake within three 
years, but provided the cause shall not be deemed 
to have accrued until the aggrieved party discovers 
the facts constituting fraud or mistake. Plaintiffs 
claim the statute began to run as of the date of 
execution; viz., August 13, 1963, rather than the 
date of delivery - termination of the escrow. 
"A deed in escrow, under the conditional sales 
contract, is effective as a conveyance after 
performance of the contract obligations, and upon 
delivery by the depository. Except for unusual 
circumstances (those which would create a shocking 
injustice), which the Court does not find present 
here, the date of delivery of the deed does not 
relay back to the date of execution of the deed 
[underling added], or the commencement of tEe 
escrow period. Thus, in this matter, the limitation 
period to reform the deed did not commence to run 
until May 15, 1970." 
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In the instant case, Plaintiff BECKSTEAD did not 
receive her deed from the escrow depository until 198 3. 
Laches and the Statute of Limitations should not conmence to 
run until receipt of her deed. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the Corporation Nine 
v. Taylor case cited above, gave the vendor until time to 
perform to furnish clear and marketable title. This same 
rule should apply to a vendee seeking to obtain that which 
is purchased. To rule otherwise would require the vendee to 
bring his action before performance is required, but not 
permit the suit because the vendor had until time of 
performance to deliver. The Utah Supreme Court, in the 
Corporation Nine v. Taylcr case, took this position, unless 
it would appear to be impossible for seller to be able to 
perform. In the instant case, the subsequent purchasers 
(Defendants herein) were on notice by recording of Notice of 
Contract Interest and by actual notice prior to their recording 
any claim to the acre in question. With this knowledge by 
Defendants, they are not bona fide purchasers without notice 
and they should not be heard to say that it is impossible 
for title to be delivered to Plaintiffs. 
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POINT TWO 
WHETHER A SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY 
CHARTED WITH INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE AND CLAIMS OF 
A PURPORTED PRIOR PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY BY 
REASON OF RECORDING OF A NOTICE OF CONTRACT INTEREST, 
AND AFTER PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF CLAIM TO REAL 
PROPERTY, CAN BE PLACED IN TITLE BECAUSE OF THE 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (THREE YEARS 
FROM MISTAKE) PRIOR TO AN ACTION BEING BROUGHT TO 
CORRECT AN ERROR IN THE CONTRACT AND DEED. 
2. A purchaser of real property is charged with 
knowledge of information, claims, etc., recorded prior to 
recording his claim or interest in the real property. 
Defendant DONALD DENNIS did not receive or record his deed 
(May 1979) until after Notice of Contract Interest in sale 
of the same property between Plaintiff BECKSTEAD and Plaintiffs 
BERTRAND and FONTAINE had been recorded (February 1979), and 
after; being told by Plaintiff BECKSTEAD that he could not 
have three acres because she (BECKSTEAD) had bought ten 
acres and there were only two acres left. Defendant DENNIS 
acquired his deed after personal notice and recording of the 
BECKSTEAD-BERTRAND interest, and he becomes an interloper to 
title subject to a quiet title action by Plaintiffs. UCA 
57-3-2, 1953, as amended, states that recording imparts 
notice of every instrument in writing recorded from the time 
of filing. 
The Statute of Limitations does *not apply in an 
action to seek reformation where violation of prior sale was 
known to subsequent purchaser. The Utah Court, in Bench v. Pace, 
-14-
538 P.2d 180, held that Statute of Limitations did not apply 
where a mistake was made in not reciting the reservation of 
oil and gas rights in a contract, known at the time of 
execution of the contract, which facts were well known to 
the contract purchasers of the property. The Court held: 
"The Defendant's ownership of the mineral estate 
was not threatened until these proceedings were 
initiated, and in view of these circumstances we 
are of the opinion that the Statute of Limitations 
and doctrine of laches do not apply." 
POINT THREE 
WHETHER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD AND 
MISTAKE IS TOLLED WHERE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE 
STATUE RUNS IS IN POSSESSION OR CONSTRUCTIVE 
POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES. 
3. Statute of Limitations for fraud and mistake 
do not apply where the one against whom the Statute is to be 
asserted is in possession. The Utah Court in Jensen v. Manila 
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 565 P.2d 63, found the claim of laches adequately 
answered in Tapler v. Fray, 184 Pa. Supr. 239, 132 A.2d 890 
(1957). The Utah Court quoted the Tapler Court: 
"Plaintiffs were in undisputed possession of the 
premises, and there was no occasion to bring this 
action earlier. Laches will not be imputed to one 
constantly in complete possession of premises, the 
title to which is in controversy." 
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Th e record in this case indicates that possession 
of the acre in question was partly in Plaintiffs and party 
in Defendants; the fence placed on the property was not 
placed on a deed line. 
POINT FOUR 
WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS AGAINST A 
PARTY IN AN ACTION WHO FILES AN ACTION AFTER 
DISCOVERY OF A MISTAKE BUT DOES NOT ALLEGE FRAUD 
FOR A MISTAKE. 
4. For the Statute of Limitations for fraud and 
mistake to apply, there must be an allegation of fraud or 
mistake. In Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, the Utah Supreme 
Court said: 
"The Defendant's final contention is that Plaintiff's 
cause of action, if any, is barred by 104-2-24(3), 
UCA (194 3), which provides that an action for 
relief on the ground of fraud or mistake must be 
commenced within three years. This contention, 
too, must fail. There is no allegation of fraud 
or mistake in the Complaint. The Plaintiff did 
not rely upon either ground for recovery in this 
action. It is not intended that Amber fraudulently 
procured the conveyance of the property to her 
upon the promise to hold it for the use and 
benefit of Plaintiffs. Clearly, the statute 
relied upon by Defendant is not here applicable." 
In Wahlen v. Scottsdale Plumbing Co., Inc., 55-57 
P. 2d 190, the Arizona Court of Appeals (1976), stated in a 
question of the applicability of Statute of Limitations for 
fraud and mistake: 
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"Assuming ARS Section 12-54 3 is applicable, this 
statute provides in part that: 'There Shall be 
commenced to prosecute within three years after 
the cause of action accrues, not afterwards, the 
following actions: "For relief on the ground of 
fraud or mistake..."1 
"We first note that the statute on its face is 
applicable to the commencement of 'actions for 
relief on the ground of fraud' and forbids such 
'action' after the passage of three years. 
However, if the fraudulent character of the deed 
arises in some other way than in an 'action' there 
is nothing on the face of the statute that prevents 
it from being assailed for fraud." 
The Arizona Court further commented: 
"See also Davidson v. Salt Lake City, 95 U. 347, 
81 P.2d 374 (1938) . Puccetti quoted favorably 
from Stewart v. Hansen, 32 Cal. 260 (Cal. 1867) 
which elaborated on the underlying theory as 
follows: 
'It is true that the clouds in question have 
their inception in fraud; but fraud is not a 
universal characteristic of the cause of 
action and cannot, therefore, be adopted as a 
test of the true nature of the action when its 
position in the various categories presented 
by the Statute of Limitation comes to be 
considered.... The gravamen of the action is 
that the conveyances of which complaint is 
made, are clouds upon the title, and for that 
reason, and that only, their cancellation is 
asked. The right of Plaintiff to his relief 
does not depend altogether upon the question 
of whether they are tainted with fraud, but 
upon the fact that they are clouds. Conveyances 
not tainted with fraud may cloud the true 
title. Hence, fraud is a false quantity when 
it would come to assign an action of this 
character to its proper class under the Statute 
of Limitation. If fraud exists, it does so 
merely as a feature of the case and not as a 
test of the true nature of the cause of action 
within meaning of the Statute.' 32 Cal. at 
263." 
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Plaintiffs in this action ask that their deed be 
reformed to correct an error in description and that the 
deed to subsequent purchasers be voided. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs in this action action ask that the 
decision of the lower Court granting Summary Judgment and 
dismissing Plaintiffs1 action for failure to file within 
three years after discovery of a mistake be reversed and 
that Plaintiffs be permitted to take their action to trial, 
Respectfully submitted, 
this 22nd day of March, 
1985 
7 
ROBERT E. FROERER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
536 - 24th St., Suite 2B 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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